

Water Rate Structures to Promote Conservation

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How should water be priced?

- › Three common goals of a water price structure:
 - › **Efficiency**: send an appropriate marginal cost signal
 - › **Equity**: ensure affordability for essential uses
 - › **Financial stability**: maintain a balanced budget

Common rate structures

- › **Flat rate**: a fixed charge per billing period
- › **Uniform rate**: a constant price per unit consumed
- › **Increasing block rate**: price per unit depends on amount consumed
- › **Allocation-based rate**: blocks depend on household and environmental characteristics

Water pricing in California



- › As of 2005: about half of all public utilities (400+) were using increasing block rates
- › As of 2008: fewer than 14 utilities were using allocation-based rates
- › From 2009-2011: 9 more utilities adopted allocation-based rates
 - › Major driver: Governor's *20x2020 Water Conservation Plan*
- › As of 2014: concerted effort in inland southern California to promote adoption of allocation-based rates.
 - › Part of \$22M Emergency Drought Grant Program
- › Research questions for allocation-based rates:
 - › Demand effects?
 - › Welfare effects?

Case study #1: EMWD

Eastern Municipal Water District (EMWD) switched from uniform rates to increasing block allocation-based rates in April 2009:

- › *Indoor water use: $w_1 = (HHS \times PPA) \times DF + IV$*
- › *Outdoor water use: $w_2 = (ET \times CF \times IA + OV) \times DF$*
- › *Excessive water use: $w_3 = \frac{1}{2}(w_1 + w_2)$*
- › *Wasteful water use: in excess of w_3*

Data: spatial distribution of sample households




- Sample accounts
- All water service connections

Estimation strategy


- ▶ Estimate a uniform rate demand model using data from January 2003 – December 2008
 - ▶ Estimated with household-level fixed effects
- ▶ Use the model to predict demand from April 2009 – April 2014 under equivalent uniform prices
- ▶ Difference between actual and predicted demand is the water budget-induced demand effect

Estimation results




Estimated demand effect

Observed vs. Predicted Demand
12-month moving average




Larger, more persistent effects on inefficient users


Demand reduction attributable to EMWD's allocation-based rates (Baerenklau et al. 2014)



Case study #2: MNWD




Effect on inefficient households



Rate structure comparison

Water price comparison for a typical household



Summary: demand effects

- > Demand reduction of up to 15% overall, and up to 30% by inefficient users, across two water districts.
 - > Larger reductions when initial efficiency is lower.
 - > Larger reductions when mid-tier prices are higher.
- > Reductions by inefficient users are the most resilient to changing conditions that would otherwise tend to increase demand.
 - > Consistent with a price-induced “ratcheting effect”: higher prices create new habits that become permanent.
- > EMWD: Real average prices rose ~3% under water budgets, but would have had to rise ~30% under uniform pricing to achieve the same demand effect.
 - > Significant conservation potential while also addressing equity concerns.

Welfare effects under alternative policies

	Allocation-based rates	Fixed block rates with price and fixed cost adjustments	Uniform price increase with fixed cost decrease	Quantity restriction with fixed cost increase
Minimum EV (\$/month)	-170.93	-357.81	-139.95	-16.41
Mean EV (\$/month)	1.98	2.32	-7.40	-7.26
Median EV (\$/month)	5.70	7.78	-5.82	-7.16
Maximum EV (\$/month)	168.28	170.36	7.10	-6.69
# of better-off households	8455	9015	2298	0
% of better-off households	62%	66%	17%	0%
	Mean equivalent variation (\$/month) by income terciles			
Top third	4.99 (1.4%)	4.66 (1.3%)	-7.90 (-2.2%)	-7.24 (-2.0%)
Middle third	2.51 (0.8%)	3.12 (1.0%)	-6.78 (-2.1%)	-7.23 (-2.3%)
Bottom third	-1.57 (-0.6%)	-0.82 (-0.3%)	-7.51 (-2.7%)	-7.30 (-2.6%)